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Abstract 
Influential studies have suggested that initial conditions can have persis-
tent effects on workers’ careers within firms. It is a longstanding question 
among economists whether such lasting wage differentials among firms 
and industries are due to persistent deviations of wages from workers’ 
skills due to contracting and market frictions, or whether they arise from 
permanent differences among workers’ skills. However, there is currently 
little representative evidence on firm-entry cohort effects and few explicit 
tests of alternative explanations. We use information on the universe of 
workers from a large German manufacturing sector from matched em-
ployer-employee records to show that firm-entry cohort effects are a per-
vasive phenomenon for the firms we study. The cohort effects we estimate 
are highly heterogeneous across firms and slowly fade over time. We also 
find that wage premiums on the past job are lost at job displacement, and 
that initial positive effects on wage levels at the new job fades over time. 
This suggests that at least part of firm-entry cohort effects arise from 
transitory rents, and that initial effects from previous wages fade as work-
ers’ search for better jobs. 
 
JEL-Classfication: J62, J24, D83 
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1 Introduction 
Economists have long been interested in how persistent the effects of 
short-term unexpected shocks in the labor market are on workers’ careers 
(e.g., Okun 1973). Using newly available longitudinal data, an increasing 
number of papers suggest that the starting conditions in the first year of a 
worker’s job or labor market entry can indeed have log-term effects on 
earnings and career development (e.g., Oreopoulos, von Wachter, Heisz 
2006, Oyer 2006, Kahn 2005). For example, Oreopoulos et al. (2006) find 
that the effect of graduating college in a recession fades after ten years 
for the typical worker, and has permanent negative effects for less-able 
graduates. While clearly a concern for policy makers and the public, such 
lasting effects of entry conditions are also difficult to explain in the context 
of standard models of wage setting and career development. In particular, 
they raise the question of whether wages persistently deviate from work-
ers’ skills because of market frictions or wage contracts. 
This question has received particular attention in the context of cohort-
effects within firms. A small but influential number of papers have argued 
that similar workers entering firms in different years receive permanently 
different wage profiles (Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 1994, Beaudry and 
DiNardo 1991). Several approaches have been proposed to rationalize 
such persistent shifts in firms’ wage structures. The first maintains that 
the degree of rent sharing between workers and firms varies with outside 
market conditions at the time of entry (Beaudry and DiNardo 1991). The 
second maintains that cohort effects arise from variation in the quality of 
jobs and career opportunities available within the firm (Okun 1973). If dif-
ferent jobs provide different general experience or training provided by 
the firm, cohort effects can also arise from permanent changes in workers’ 
skills (Gibbons and Waldman 2004). 
Although these explanations have very different underlying views of wage 
determination, they have similar predictions for the degree of persistence 
of entry level conditions. Thus, it is difficult to distinguish among them 
based on cohort effects in earnings alone. However, these explanations 
have alternative implications for the persistence of entry level conditions 
as workers switch employers. While effects due to rent-sharing or job 
quality should fade for those workers losing their jobs, changes in skills 
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should affect workers’ wages even at new employers. Despite offering 
clear predictions, these hypotheses have not been tested, in part because 
data used in existing work had little information on workers’ job mobility 
and their employers. 
More generally, since existing studies focused on single firms (Baker, 
Gibbs, and Holmstrom 1994) or particular time periods (Beaudry and Di-
Nardo 1991), at present little is known about whether firm-entry cohort 
effects are a pervasive phenomenon in the wider labor market. Given the 
degree of heterogeneity in other aspects of firms’ wage structures (Abowd 
and Kramarz 1999), and given the amount of heterogeneity in firm growth 
rates (Davis and Haltiwanger 1992) it is conceivable that firm-entry cohort 
effects are a widespread phenomenon that affects firms to different de-
grees. However, until now little information is available on how pervasive 
such cohort effects are. 
In this chapter, we provide three contributions to the present literature. 
First, we use data on the complete career histories of all workers in a 
large German manufacturing sector to describe the prevalence and het-
erogeneity of firm-entry cohort effects for a large sample of firms over 
more than 20 years. To ensure the cohort differences in wages we find are 
not due to selective entry of workers into firms, the nature of our data al-
lows us to control for observable firm and worker characteristics as well as 
worker fixed effects. In addition, the long time horizon allows us to exam-
ine whether entry-conditions fade within firms, and whether firms’ wages 
tend to converge to a common market wage over time.  
Second, we exploit the predictions of the alternative models for the impact 
of job loss on wages to learn more about the sources of firm-entry cohort 
effects. To do so, we complement the descriptive analysis with a study of 
the effects of job displacement on wage changes for workers with high, 
medium, or low starting wages at the lost job. Thereby, we are particu-
larly interested in whether wage premiums fade upon job loss, and 
whether workers recover some of their past advantages with time since 
job loss. 
Third, we analyze the effect of past wage premiums on the level of wages 
after job loss. Since controlling for observable characteristics past wages 
are partly a function of unobserved ability, we would expect a positive cor-
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relation. However, if the ability of job losers is not observed perfectly by 
the market, temporary wage premiums may also serve as a temporary 
signal that fades over time. If on the other hand wage premiums are 
driven by permanent skill differences, we would expect their effect to be 
stable or increasing. 
We find that in the manufacturing sector we study, firm-entry cohort ef-
fects are a significant phenomenon. Similar firms pay different wages to 
similar workers starting their jobs at different points in time. However, we 
also find that this is not simply a homogeneous market wide phenomenon 
– there is considerable heterogeneity between firms and between cohorts 
in the incidence and strength of cohort effects. A further key result is that 
in our sample entry-level differences in wages fade within firms, and there 
appears convergence to a market wage, but reversion is very slow. Thus, 
wage differences between cohorts of similar workers are highly persistent 
but not permanent. 
We also find that workers with high starting wages have higher and per-
sistent wage losses at job loss; workers with relatively low starting wages 
on the other hand seem to gain from losing their job. Thus, part of initial 
wage differences appears to be temporary firm-specific rents. Moreover, 
there appears to be mean reversion at job loss. However, markets do not 
seem to be able to fully tell apart ability from rents in the short run, and 
past wage advantages carry a premium for the level of wage after job loss 
that fades over time. 
These results suggest that firm-entry cohort effects at least in part consist 
of time varying differences in rent sharing or job quality. Clearly, part of 
the effects we find may also arise due to the presence of other individual 
specific rents, for example from job search. Future research based on a 
larger sample of firms and workers able to explicitly analyze the persis-
tence of cohort-effects at job loss will help to shed light on this question. 
The results also suggest that characteristics of the previous job, such as 
job tenure or past wages, are not just a fixed measure of worker quality, 
as suggested in the prior literature (e.g., Kletzer 1989) but also appear to 
influence temporary wage components. Among others, this could arise if 
previous job characteristics affect workers’ reservation wages. The effect 
of these initial conditions fades, consistent with the notion of continued 
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on-the-job search. In addition, previous job characteristics may function 
as temporary signals of workers’ skills1. 
The outline of the chapter is as follows. First, we give a brief overview of 
the conceptual background, the empirical approach, and the data we use. 
Second, we describe the prevalence of cohort effects in a sample of large 
and stable manufacturing firms. Third, we analyze the effect of past start-
ing wages on the extent of wage changes at job displacement. Fourth, we 
study the effect of the starting wage on the lost job on the level of ensu-
ing wages. The last section concludes and offers suggestions for future 
research. 
2 Conceptual Approach 
There are two basic explanations for the persistence of differences in 
starting wages of workers entering the same firm at different moments in 
time. The first view suggests that wages contain firm-specific components 
that can differ across entry-cohorts but that are lost as workers move be-
tween firms. This may arise due to differences in the degree of rent shar-
ing among workers and firms, for example due to the degree of pressure 
in the outside labor market. Or it may arise to the presence of long-term 
implicit insurance contracts (Beaudry and DiNardo 1991). Alternatively, 
this may be due to variation in the quality of jobs offered within firms over 
time (Okun 1973). For example, in periods of high growth firms may offer 
more jobs that pay more, either because of higher productivity or due to 
higher incentive wages. Persistent differences may also arise if some jobs 
provide higher accumulation of firm specific-skills.  
These alternative sources of wage differentials have the similar implication 
that the wage advantages they may imply for certain cohorts are lost if 
workers leave the firm. Since voluntary movers may not leave their job if 
compensated for giving up of these wage premia, the loss is likely to be 
visible only for workers who move their job involuntarily. Thus, we would 
expect wage losses for those job losers to be largest that had the highest 
wage premiums. For these displaced workers, we would expect to see 
mean reversion; i.e., those workers with below average cohort-wages ex-
                                                
1 However, in that case the effect of the initial signal should not fade over time (Farber 
and Gibbons 1996, Altonji and Pierret 2001). 
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perience wage gains relative to those workers with above average cohort-
wages as absent any skill differentials both groups draw again wages from 
the same market wage distribution.  
Since the workers with below average cohort-wages could have obtained 
higher wages on the outside market, some mobility friction must prevent 
them from moving jobs. Since cohort-effects are likely to be more typi-
cally in large firms with longer job attachment, this is likely to arise due to 
the presence of average wage premiums large firms pay (Oi and Idson 
1999). Nevertheless, we would expect that on average workers with below 
average cohort-wages are more like to switch employers. Similarly, firms 
may face an incentive to fire workers with above-average wages if these 
are due to a higher amount of rents. 
The second broad view suggests firm-entry cohort effects arise from 
changes in workers’ general skill level. This may occur if in some periods 
firms offer a larger amount of jobs with high a degree of experience ac-
cumulation or general training (Gibbons and Waldman 2004). In this case, 
differential entry-level conditions reflect actual differences in workers’ skill 
levels and can arise even in an environment where each worker is paid his 
marginal product. This is in contrast with the first set of explanations, that 
each suggested that workers with similar skills would be paid different 
wages, either because of rent sharing or differences in job quality. 
Clearly, the second view suggests that even workers losing their job invol-
untarily will maintain their wage advantage on their new job at least in the 
medium run. While in the years immediately following the job loss some of 
the advantage may be lost as workers have to find a new job match or as 
the market may be uncertain about workers’ ability, in the medium run 
workers should again obtain a wage that reflects their higher (or lower) 
marginal product. This stands in contrast to the implications of the first 
view, in which all cohort-wage differences should be lost at job loss. In 
particular, even if past wages may serve as a positive signal for ability in 
the years immediately after job loss, the effect of past cohort conditions 
should fade with time since job loss – the opposite implication as from the 
second view. 
The existing empirical literature does not address the question of persis-
tence of conditions on the past job for workers switching employers. One 
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strand of literatures aims at characterizing the presence of firm-entry co-
hort effects, but pays little attention as to what happens when workers 
leave firms. In this vein, Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994) analyze the 
role of cohort effects within a single firm. Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) use 
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) to analyze the effect of labor market conditions on work-
ers’ wages as they stay within the firm. Neither paper analyzes the persis-
tence of the wage effect it finds as workers move between firms, mostly 
due to a lack of data.  
Another strand of literature examines the extent and determinants of 
wage changes at job loss in detail, but typically pays less attention to the 
role of past job characteristics2. The only important exception is the role of 
past job tenure. Since there is no market for firm-worker specific skills or 
match rents, the wage gradient with job tenure can be seen as a form of 
rent sharing between workers and firms. A worker losing his job should 
then lose these firm-specific rents. This is what the literature has found, 
and the effect appears to be particularly strong for a loss in industry ten-
ure (Neal 1995, Parent 2000).  
In this context, Kletzer (1989) has found that workers with higher past job 
tenure have higher wages on the job after job loss. This may signify that 
workers with high job tenure are also of high ability, i.e., positive wage 
tenure profiles in part reflect ability differences between high and low ten-
ured workers3. A similar argument holds for the effect of the initial wage 
on the lost job. Even conditional on observable characteristics – such as 
age and education – past starting wages will be a function of unobserved 
worker ability, and will thus positively correlate with wages on the current 
job. 
However, past tenure and earnings may also influence workers’ reserva-
tion wages. In this case, high past wages may lead workers to search for 
                                                
2 Past industry, occupation, and firm size are an exception. See for example Ruhm 
(1991), Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993), Gibbons and Katz (1991), or Farber 
(1997, 2003). For a survey of this literature see Farber (1999). 
3 This idea is also exploited in Abraham and Farber (1987), who use completed job ten-
ure as an indicator for the quality of a job match to correct for selection bias in esti-
mates of the return to job tenure. 
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jobs more intensely. If this is the case, there is again an initial correlation 
of past job characteristics and initial earnings after layoffs. Over time, 
these workers’ wages are again determined by market conditions (work-
ers’ skill levels and the overall wage distribution), thus the effect of the 
reservation wage would be expected to fade. 
In addition, if the market observes workers’ ability only imperfectly it may 
use past job tenure or past wages as signals to infer about their produc-
tivity (Farber and Gibbons 1996, Altonji and Pierret 2001). In this case, 
part of the positive effect of past job tenure may be due to an initial sig-
naling effect. However, this effect should not fade over time even if mar-
kets learn about workers’ ability. 
If on the other hand firm-entry cohort effects are due to differential skill 
accumulation, we should observe the opposite phenomenon. Initially, 
some of the higher skill embodied in the cohort-effect may be discounted 
if displaced workers receive a wage based on average skills. Over time, as 
markets learn about workers’ true ability, we would expect the effect of 
past wages to remain stable, or least not to decline further. 
3 Empirical Approach 
The analysis of the chapter consists of two parts, each based on a differ-
ent sample of firms. The first, descriptive part of the paper studies the 
importance of firm-entry cohort effects for a sample of large stable firms 
in car manufacturing sector in Germany. The second part analyzes wage 
changes and wage levels of job losers using the complete available career 
histories of all workers who ever worked in German car manufacturing. 
The data is drawn from the German employee registry that records com-
plete career information as well as basic demographics for the universe of 
German workers covered by social security and their employers from 1975 
to 2003 and is further described below.  
The goal of the first part of the paper is to describe the incidence, hetero-
geneity, and persistence of firm-entry cohort effects within a large but 
specific sector of the economy. The focus on a single sector allows us to 
exclude wage differences arising from differential industry trends or busi-
ness cycles. To study the magnitude and evolution of average cohort 
wages, we concentrated our analysis on stable establishments with a large 
enough rate of inflow of new workers in every period.  For each of the 55 
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firms that survive our selection criteria further described below, we esti-
mate cohort effects following the approach in Baker, Gibbs, and Holm-
strom (1994) (henceforth BGH). To do so, we proceed in three steps. 
First, we collapse our data to the level of firm-tenure-entry year cells. 
Second, we use the cell level averages to run the following wage regres-
sion at the firm level.  
(1)  fctfctfcfftfffct uXtengw +++++= βφλα )(log  
This modeling approach allows for a firm-specific quartic tenure profile 
( )(tg f ), a constant and year effects, as well as for firm-specific effects of 
average entry cohort characteristics. Third, we regress the estimated firm-
entry cohort effects ( cfφ ) on a firm specific trend and treat the residual 
from that regression as cohort effects for the remainder of our study. As 
explained in BGH, in the presence of year and tenure effects, one cannot 
identify the linear component of the cohort effect. Since we are mainly in-
terested in examining the presence and significance of cohort effects, the 
chosen approach suffices for our purposes.  
In addition to including average observable characteristics at the cohort 
level, we also ran the model in Equation 1 at the individual level and in-
cluded worker fixed effects. Unlike in the case of BGH who only had access 
to data on all workers at a single firm, this is possible in our case since we 
have the entire career information of workers who ever worked at each of 
our firms. This further alleviates the concern that the cohort effects identi-
fied in Equation 1 may still be due to selective entry of workers of differ-
ent skill levels.  
An important aspect of firm-entry cohort effects is their persistence – do 
differences in entry level wages last unfettered forever, as found in the 
firm analyzed by BGH, or does convergence take place? Convergence may 
be of two kinds. First, high wage cohorts may converge to the average 
wage level within the firm. In this case, the relevant benchmark and 
speed of convergence is determined by the firm-level average. Second, 
high wage cohorts may converge to a market level wage. I.e., reversion of 
high initial starting wages may be faster if they are high relative to the 
overall market wage.  
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To examine the extent and speed of reversion of initial wage differences, 
we modify the above model and estimate the following regression for each 
firm in our sample of large stable firms 
(2)  fctcffcffctfftfffct utenhXtengw ++++++= 10 )()(log φφβλα  
Thereby, 0cfφ  measures the difference in initial starting wages for entry 
cohort c, and 1cfφ  measures the firm-specific rate of decay of the initial ef-
fect. We experimented with linear, quartic, and unrestricted specifications 
for the decay function )(thf , and found a linear specification works aston-
ishingly well for the most relevant time horizon of about ten years of job 
tenure.  
The second part of the paper studies the effect of starting wages on the 
effect of job displacements. Once we have identified displacement events 
and an appropriate estimation methodology, the analysis is relatively 
straightforward. In particular, we are interested whether wage losses at 
job displacement differ by the level of the starting wage at the previous 
job. Ideally, we would have analyzed the effect of firm-entry cohort effects 
themselves on the extent of wage loss for workers losing their jobs from 
our sample of large and stable firms. However, for the sector in question 
the sample of such workers was too small for a meaningful analysis. 
Thus, in the second part of the paper, we analyze the effect of a job dis-
placement on wage changes and post-job loss wage levels for all workers 
who worked in German car manufacturing at some point between 1975 
and 2003. We define a displaced worker to be a worker who had at least 
three (or five) years of tenure at a given firm, and who had at least 30 
days of unemployment following the job move. We experimented with al-
ternative definitions based on mass-layoffs at the establishment level, but 
again found that we had too few workers affected by such events in our 
sample4. 
                                                
4 In separate work using the German Socio-Economic Panel, Goerlitz and von Wachter 
(2006) find that while imposing unemployment does tend to raise the estimated impact 
of job losses relative to self-reported layoff status, the difference is reduced signifi-
cantly when worker fixed effects are included. 
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We then study the wage change of displaced workers relative to the wage 
held prior to job loss for up to fifteen years after the job change. Specifi-
cally, the basic model we estimate at the individual level is  
(3)  ittit
k
k
k
itiit ugDw ++++= ∑
−≥
λδα )(explog 15
3
 
where the dummies ikD  indicate whether a year is k periods before or af-
ter a job loss and y stands for calendar year. This estimates the effect of 
wage changes at job loss controlling for a quartic polynomial in potential 
labor market experience, unrestricted year effects, and worker fixed ef-
fects. This model essentially extends Farber’s estimates based on the Dis-
placed Worker Survey (DWS) Supplement to the CPS into an analysis cov-
ering several periods after the job loss. In particular, this approach does 
not keep a control group of workers who did not lose their job, and thus 
differs from the estimation method implemented by Bender, Dustman, 
Margolis, and Meghir (2002) for Germany based on Jacobson, Lalonde, 
and Sullivan (1993). Instead, the year effects in this sample are identified 
from the baseline period of workers later experiencing displacement5.  
The main estimates we are interested in are estimates of the earnings loss 
by groups of workers with low, medium, and high starting wages relative 
to their average wage. Thus, we re-estimate the model in Equation 3 in-
teracting the time effect as well as the displacement-time effects with 
dummies for whether a worker’s starting wage at the lost job was in the 
bottom, middle, or top of the wage distribution (we choose the inter-
quartile range as cut off points). This results in the following model for es-
timation 
(4)  
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The estimates of this model show the wage changes by groups of workers 
with different starting wages relative to their own group-specific wage at 
the time of job loss.  
                                                
5 To identify the worker fixed effects, we have to exclude on pre-period dummy. To iden-
tify the year effects, we have to exclude one additional dummy. Thus, we keep obser-
vations on workers up to five years prior to displacement, and include dummies for up 
to three years prior to displacement. 
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In future work, we plan to include ‘stayers’ – workers who did not lose 
their job – in the model as a control group to replicate the classic event 
study design introduced by Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993). We 
will also analyze wage losses by other worker characteristics such as edu-
cation, age, or past job tenure. Similarly, we can exploit further prediction 
regarding the effect of past job characteristics on the wage changes of 
voluntary movers. 
The last set of models we estimate regress the level of log wages after job 
loss. To do so, we begin by implementing the models estimated by Kletzer 
(1989) who concentrates on the effect of past job tenure. We first aug-
ment Kletzer’s model with the effect of past starting wages. Then we ex-
tend her approach and interact past job tenure and past starting wages 
with time since job loss. Thus, we are interested in the coefficients on the 
interactions with time since job loss in the following model  
(5)  ittiti
LostJob
i
LostJob
iit gXwww ελγτββα ++++++= )(explogloglog 0100  
where τ  stands fort the years since job loss. This model is only estimated 
based on observations after a job loss. The important extension of Klet-
zer’s model is made possible by the availability of longer time series in our 
data, and allows us to study to what extent the immediate effect of past 
job and worker characteristics on wages post-job loss fades over time. Al-
ternatively, we will be able to see whether past wages are driven by com-
ponents of actual or predicted worker skill whose effect stays stable. 
4 Administrative Longitudinal Matched Data 
The data used in this chapter are drawn from the German employment 
register containing information on all employees covered by social secu-
rity, representing around 80 percent of the German workforce.6 The em-
ployment register takes stock of existing employees at each establishment 
twice a year. Since the notification procedure for social security also re-
                                                
6 An overview of the data is given in Bender et al. (2000), a more detailed description 
can be found in Bender et al. (1996). For further information and citations as well as 
accessibility see http://www.research-data-center.de. Coverage includes full- and part-
time employees of private enterprises, apprentices, and other trainees, as well as tem-
porarily suspended employment relationships. The self-employed, civil servants, and 
students are excluded. 
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quires employers to record any permanent or temporary change of em-
ployment relationships, the employment register contains detailed histo-
ries for each worker’s time in covered employment. The main information 
contained in the register for administrative purposes (and therefore the 
most reliable) are gross daily wages subject to social security contribu-
tions and the exact periods during which the employee worked in the so-
cial security system. In addition, the data contain basic demographic in-
formation as well as information on occupation, industry, job-status, and 
education.7 Most important for the present purpose, the data also contain 
unique establishment identifiers. These were used to create a separate 
data set of establishment characteristics that were aggregated up from 
the employment register and merged back onto the individual level data. 
Characteristics include among others establishment size, employment 
growth, and average wages. The relevant entity throughout the empirical 
analysis is the establishment. Despite the inaccuracy it entails in some 
cases, we will keep using the terms establishment and firm interchangea-
bly for the rest of the analysis.8 
The sample used for this chapter consists of information on the universe 
of workers and establishments from the West German car manufacturing 
sector. In a first step we selected all employees who worked at least one 
day between 1975 and 2003 in an establishment of this sector (a total of 
162,332 establishments). To ensure that the sample is consistent in time, 
we chose only those notifications where the employees worked part- or 
fulltime. We dropped apprentices from the main analysis to avoid con-
founding job changes at end of apprenticeship with regular job displace-
ment and to be consistent with the concept of firm-entry cohort effect 
typically analyzed in the literature. We also dropped workers with missing 
education and who are younger than 21 and older than 64.  
                                                
7 The entity reporting is the establishment for which an employee works and can thus 
change over time. This can lead to mistakes in the coding of some demographic vari-
ables (e.g., nationality or marital status) and in particular education (which tends to re-
flect required rather than actual qualification). 
8 Unfortunately, it is currently not possible to link establishments that belong to a com-
mon parent firm. 
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Using this sample we aggregated up the individual level information into a 
cell-level data set at the establishment, year, and entry cohort level that 
contains the size of each entering cohort in each year at the firm, as well 
as average earnings and basic average demographic characteristics (such 
as average age, average education, or fraction female). To obtain a mean-
ingful basis for the descriptive analysis of firm-entry cohort effects, from 
this cell-level data set we extracted a subset of firms that had a suffi-
ciently large inflow of workers each year for an extended period of time. 
In particular, we required firms to have at least ten entering cohorts with 
at least ten employees, at least a hundred employees over ten years, and 
at least 21 entering cohorts. This leaves us with a total number of 55 
firms. This restriction ensures both a reasonable sample of firms as well as 
a meaningful base for calculation of a large number of firm-entry cohort 
effects. We have experimented with the cut-off points, without a notice-
able difference in results. In addition, to ensure we observe each cohort 
for an extended amount of time we only consider cohorts entering before 
1997. 
For the displacement analysis, we selected from our sample of car manu-
facturing all workers with at least three years of tenure who changed em-
ployers and who spend at least thirty days in unemployment after moving. 
For this sample, we only kept observations that were at least five years 
before and at most 15 years after the job loss. Characteristics of various 
samples of displaced workers are shown in Table 1. 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 19/2007   
 
 
18
Table 1: Sample Characteristics of Stable Firms and Displaced Workers in 
West-German Car Manufacturing 1975 to 2003 
Panel A: Basic Characteristics of 55 Stable and Large Firms in Car Manufacturing 
  Average  Std.  Dev.  Median 
Number of Cohorts 19,6 4,4 22,0 
Employment Size 6376,7 9560,8 2161,0 
Size of Entry Cohort  482,3 1678,8 88,0 
Average Cohort Age 39,8 6,3 40,5 
Average Cohort Fraction Female 0,11 0,05 0,10 
Average Cohort Years of Education 10,50 0,63 10,25 
Average Cohort Starting Wage 4,33 0,10 4,31 
Average Cohort Log Real Daily Wage 4,49 0,17 4,49 
Notes: Statistics based on firm-year-cohort observations or averages. Average cohort characteris-
tics are weighted by cohort size. 
Panel B: Average Characteristics of Various Samples of Displaced Workers  
Years of Job Tenure Prior to Job Loss Three Five  
Three, From 
55 Large  
Stable Firms 
Fraction Female 0,14 0,14 0,14 
Fraction Non-German 0,17 0,18 0,21 
Years of Education 10,45 10,39 10,21 
Average Age 35,30 37,23 34,40 
Average Potential Experience 18,85 20,84 18,19 
Average Tenure on Lost Job 5,57 7,70 3,31 
Fraction Part Time on Lost Job 0,03 0,03 0,08 
Fraction Low-Skill Blue Collar on Lost Job 0,37 0,38 0,50 
Fraction High-Skill Blue Collar on Lost Job 0,43 0,42 0,49 
Fraction Low-Skill White Collar on Lost Job 0,18 0,18 0,29 
Average Log Real Daily Starting Wage 4,25 4,26 4,25 
Average Log Real Daily Wage 4,13 4,15 4,28 
Notes: Sample only includes observations for workers who moved jobs followed by a spell of thirty 
days of unemployment or more at least once. Averages are taken over workers and worker-years 
ranging from 5 years before to 15 years after job loss. 
 
 
5 Empirical Results 
5.1 Firm-Entry Cohort Effects in German Car   
Manufacturing 
To illustrate our main descriptive results, we begin by showing the pattern 
of firm-entry cohort effects for a single large and stable establishment in 
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the car manufacturing sector.9 Figure 1A shows the development of aver-
age log real daily wages for bi-annual entry cohorts ranging from 1976 to 
1996. One can clearly see a rising trend and significant fluctuations in en-
try wages over time. More importantly, the difference in entry wages 
clearly leads to persistent average wage differences across cohorts. How-
ever, the figure also clearly shows a pattern of reversion. Differences in 
initial wages appear to fade over time. 
Figure 1a:  Average Wages by Bi-Annual Entry Cohorts for a Single Firm 
 
Note: For data protection reasons we have added random constant with zero mean to 
the individual wage levels. 
 
These patterns are documented explicitly in Figure 1B that shows the an-
nual entry-cohort effects obtained by estimating Equation 1 and de-
trending the resulting cohort-effects. One can clearly see permanent dif-
ferences in average wages of different firm-entry cohorts. Controlling for 
observable characteristics reduces the cohort effects only somewhat. This 
suggests that when the firm pays higher wages it attracts more able 
workers. However, if we instead control for worker fixed effects the cohort 
wage differences seem to rise, leaving us with no clear conclusion regard-
                                                
9 For data protection reasons we have added random constant with zero mean to the 
individual wage levels. 
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ing selective entry between cohorts. In either case, we find there are ro-
bust differences in average cohort wages over time in this large manufac-
turing firm, as suggested by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994) for a 
large financial service firm. 
Figure 1b:  Firm-Entry Cohort Effects and Starting Wages for a Single Firm 
 
 
However, contrary to the finding in BGH, the pattern in the figure also 
shows that average cohort differences in wages are smaller than differ-
ences in average starting wages between firm-entry cohorts. Figure 2 
shows the time pattern of reversion of initial wage differences explicitly for 
different specifications of the decay function. Unlike BGH, we find a signifi-
cant albeit slow decay of initial wage differences that lasts up to twenty 
years. Perhaps not surprisingly, we find a concave tenure wage-profile 
(the profile in BGH’s firm was linear). The pattern of decay we find is ap-
proximately linear. 
The key question then is to what extent the result of statistically and nu-
merically significant firm-entry cohort effects hold for a wider sample of 
firms as well. The answer to this question is affirmative. We ran the model 
in Equation 1 separately for each firm in our sample of 55 large and stable 
car manufacturing firms, and de-trended each set of cohort effects as de-
-.1
-.0
5
0
.0
5
.1
A
ve
ra
ge
 L
og
 R
ea
l W
ag
e
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996
Year of Entry into Firm
Year+Ten Controls Individual Controls
Person Fixed Effects Average Entry Wage
Alternative Specifications
IABDiscussionPaper No. 19/2007   
 
 
21
scribed in Section 3. The distribution of estimated cohort effects for all 
firms is shown in Figure 3 and Table 2. Panel A and B of Figure 4 show the 
distribution of the reversion of initial wage differences.  
Figure 2:  Decline in Effect of Entry Wages with Tenure at Firm  
 
 
Figure 3a:  Distribution of Firm-Entry Cohort Effects in Different Years 
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Figure 3b: Distribution of Average Firm Entry Wages: Different Years 
 
 
Table 2:  Firm-Entry Cohort Effects and Average Starting Wages in German 
Car Manufacturing 1975-2003 
Panel A: Distribution of Firm-Entry Cohort Effects by Decade 
    Without Worker Characteristics Controlling for  Worker Characteristics 
    Year-Group Year-Group 
Percentile   1970s 1980s 1990s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
10   -0,041 -0,062 -0,059 -0,041 -0,062 -0,059 
25   -0,014 -0,030 -0,027 -0,014 -0,030 -0,027 
50   0,003 -0,004 -0,003 0,003 -0,004 -0,003 
75   0,020 0,022 0,029 0,020 0,022 0,029 
90   0,052 0,052 0,067 0,052 0,052 0,067 
                
Panel B: Distribution of Average Starting Wages of Firm-Entry Cohorts 
    Without Worker Characteristics Controlling for  Worker Characteristics 
    Year-Group Year-Group 
Percentile   1970s 1980s 1990s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
10   -0,046 -0,115 -0,112 -0,043 -0,094 -0,098 
25   -0,019 -0,058 -0,060 -0,017 -0,048 -0,047 
50   0,009 -0,014 -0,009 0,005 -0,011 -0,006 
75   0,035 0,021 0,035 0,028 0,018 0,029 
90   0,079 0,064 0,092 0,062 0,051 0,068 
Notes: Distribution of average cohort wages by year-group. All models estimating cohort effects 
shown in Panel A also include a firm-specific quartic tenure profile, firm specific year effects, and 
a firm effects. The resulting firm-entry cohort effects are detrended. Average starting wages are 
net of year effects and firm effects. The observable characteristics in the right hand panels are 
fraction female, fraction non-german, fraction without degree, fraction with apprentice degree, 
fraction with college degree, fraction low skilled or high-skilled blue collar, and fratction low-
skilled white collar. All models are weighted by the cohort size.  
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Overall, we obtain five core results. 
1. There are significant cohort effects for each firm in the industry we 
study that are robust to controls for worker and firm characteristics. 
Similar workers entering firms at different times earn different wages. 
2. There is considerable heterogeneity of cohort effects between firms. The 
entry cohort effects cannot be simply driven by overall labor market 
conditions in the industry. 
3. Heterogeneity in cohort effects (both within and between firms) is in-
creasing over time. The spreading of the German wage distribution oc-
curs in part through cohort effects. 
4. Cohort wage differences are largest for entry level wages and converge 
over time within firms. However, convergence within firms is slow, such 
that persistent differences in average wages remain. 
5. Reversion of wages is faster the farther average cohort wages are from 
the overall market. Outliers tend to convergence between firms as well. 
The distribution of cohort effects with and without worker characteristics is 
shown in Table 2 for the full sample and each of the three decades of our 
sample. The distribution of F-statistics or p-values is omitted since all co-
hort effects are significant at the one percent confidence level. The table 
also shows the distribution of average entry-level wages with and without 
worker controls. The results suggest that there are important and signifi-
cant differences in average wages of firm-entry cohorts that are robust to 
controls for average worker characteristics.  
The typical de-trended cohort effect lies within plus and minus five percent 
of average firm wages. Taken at face value, they suggest that some co-
horts in some firms carry premiums or discounts on the order of five per-
cent, which corresponds to the wage effect of about one year of labor 
market experience or a year of education in Germany. Given we cannot 
identify the linear component of cohort effects, care should be taken with 
interpreting the specific magnitudes. 
The average differences in cohort effects mask even bigger differences in 
average starting wages between cohorts. Comparing Figures 3A and 3B, 
one can see that the distribution of deviations of cohorts’ starting wages 
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from firm specific averages has fatter tails. Again, although most of the 
differences are limited in magnitude, some cohorts experience large dif-
ferences in average wages.  
The distribution of cohort effect arises from differences between cohorts 
within firms. However, a large part of the variation arises from variation 
between firms for any given cohort. This is apparent from the fact that it 
holds within decades, and can be shown to hold within single years as 
well. In fact, the annual distribution of cohort effects is similar to the dec-
ade-wide distribution, suggesting that an important part of the variation is 
coming from between firms. Thus, firm-entry cohort effects cannot be 
simply explained by business cycle pressures affecting the entire industry. 
It may be that within the industry firms producing different products (say 
trucks or passenger cars) or goods of different qualities face differential 
demand conditions.  
In addition, there may be truly firm-specific differences in the evolution of 
productivity, employment, and output that affect the fortunes of workers 
entering firms at different points in time. That similar firms within sectors 
can experience vastly heterogeneous patterns of employment growth has 
been suggested in the literature before (e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger 
1992). Our findings suggest that such differences can lead to differences 
in entry wage levels and average wages between entry cohorts and be-
tween firms.  
Interestingly, the numbers in the tables and figures suggest that the dis-
tribution of entry wage differences and cohort effects has been widening 
over time. The increasing spread is consistent with a widening in the Ger-
man wage distribution in the 1990s after a period of relative stability. Our 
results suggest that part of the recent widening is due to an increasing 
spread in entry wage differences. However, our results also suggest that 
this pattern had already started in the 1980s, something typically not 
found in analyses of the overall wage distribution. 
Figure 4A shows the distribution of the fraction of the initial difference in 
average starting wages decayed at each tenure year. The figure suggests 
first, that the median rate of decay is very slow, leading to a half-life at 
about eight to nine years. Second, the figure shows that the speed of de-
cay varies widely between firms. For the bottom decile the entry wage dif-
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ference fades within three to four years, for the top ten percent the effect 
actually increases over time. Convergence does not only occur within 
firms. Figure 4B shows that cohorts that have high average wages relative 
to the overall market have faster speed of convergence. Thus, conver-
gence also occurs between firms towards the average wage in the market. 
Figure 4a:  Percentiles of Fraction of Initial Wage Effect Decayed 
 
 
Figure 4b:  Decay of Initial Effect by Percentile of Avg. Starting Wage 
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Overall, these results suggest that firm-entry cohort effects are a signifi-
cant phenomenon in a broad sample of large and stable manufacturing 
firms even when controlling for worker characteristics. There is substantial 
heterogeneity in cohort effects between firms. Convergence within and 
between firms occurs but is slow. These preliminary estimates suggest 
that firms wage structures have a component that systematically varies 
over time and differs between firms. Our documentation of this dynamic 
component complements and extends existing characterizations of static 
differences in average wages, tenure-wage profiles, and the variance of 
wages (e.g., Abowd and Kramarz 1999, Abowd, Corbel, and Kramarz 
2002, Margolis 1995).  
These results also underline the importance of efforts to understand the 
empirical sources of firm-entry cohort effects and their theoretical under-
pinnings. The descriptive results in the previous section allow no clear in-
terpretation with respect to the source of cohort effects. On the one hand, 
the fact that initial wage differences fade suggests that they must have at 
least in part been driven by temporary differences in cohort-specific rents 
or job quality. However, the high degree of persistence does not exclude 
that some of the effect is driven by lasting differences in workers’ skill lev-
els. This underscores the need of an explicit test of potential explanations 
that goes beyond purely descriptive study of wage differences themselves.  
5.2 Job Losses and Differences in Starting Wages 
As discussed at the outset, if differences in cohort wages arise due to dif-
ferences in temporary rent or job quality, they should fade if workers lose 
their job. Alternatively, if cohorts obtain different degree of training or ex-
perience, they should carry their higher skills over to their new job. As 
discussed at the outset, we study this question by comparing the wage 
losses of job losers with high or low starting wages at the lost job. The 
analysis of losses in cohort effects per se is left for future work with a lar-
ger sample of firms and workers.  
As a first step, Table 3 shows the overall effects of job displacements on 
wage changes. The time pattern before and after job loss is shown with 
standard error bands in Figure 5. The results indicate significant and large 
wage losses of about ten percent in the first year that fade in about six to 
seven years. These results are quite similar to estimates of the effect of 
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job loss in the U.S. based on the DWS (e.g., Farber 1997, 2003), and 
similar to estimates in Couch (2001) using a similar methodology and the 
German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP). Burda and Euwals (2001) confirm 
that high-wage job losers in Germany can experience very large and per-
sistent earnings losses. They also find that job losers in the bottom quar-
tile of the wage distribution tend to exhibit significant gains from job 
loss.10 
Our estimates are a larger and more persistent than a recent study of 
plant closings in Germany using the same administrative data source 
(Bender et al. 2002). These differences may arise partly due to differences 
in the definition of job loss, the estimation methodology, the sample used, 
and the time period covered. In particular, since we impose thirty days in 
unemployment to identify displaced workers, our approach may lead us to 
partially overstate the effect of job displacement. Part of the differences 
may also be due to our focus on workers losing their job in car manufac-
turing. Since the car manufacturing sector is typically a high-wage sector, 
part of the losses we observe are due to losses in the industry wage pre-
mium. 
Table 3 also shows corresponding estimates for workers that had five 
years of pre-displacement tenure, and for workers exiting the large and 
stable firms analyzed in the first part of the chapter. As expected, higher 
tenure workers experience large and more persistent wage losses. How-
ever, the wage losses of workers leaving large firms are much larger. As 
found in von Wachter and Bender (2006), workers leaving large firms 
permanently lose rents associated with jobs at large employers and never 
fully recover from the initial wage loss.11 
                                                
10 Burda and Euwal’s (2001) estimates imply lower increases at the bottom and higher 
losses at the top. They do not focus on past starting wages, however, and have a 
somewhat different definition of layoff. For they top, they demonstrate that including 
recalls, as we do here, may underestimate the effect of job loss. 
11 Large firms appear to provide an exceptional career environment that is permanently 
lost upon job displacement since on average workers will transit to a smaller firm. Von 
Wachter and Bender (2006) show that only apprentices who get displaced from large 
training firms suffer permanent losses in earnings relative to workers staying at the 
firm at the end of training. Once they control for the change in firm size at job loss, 
this excess loss disappears. 
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Table 3:  Wage Losses at Job Loss 15 Years Post Job Loss, Different  
Samples and By Starting Wage at Lost Job 
Wage Loss By Interquartile 
Range of Starting Wage of 
Lost Job, Three Years Pre-
Tenure 
Year to Job  
Loss 
Three 
Years of 
Pre-Job 
Loss Ten-
ure 
Five Years 
of Pre-Job 
Loss Ten-
ure 
Exits from 
Large and 
Stable 
Firms 
Low  Medium High 
-3 0,0043 -0,0002 0,0049 -0,0161 0,0071 0,0188 
  (0,0037) (0,0039) (0,0157) (0,0048) (0,0039) (0,0046) 
-2 0,0053 -0,0087 0,0049 -0,0294 0,0114 0,0366 
  (0,0058) (0,0061) (0,0244) (0,0063) (0,0058) (0,0062) 
-1 0,0031 -0,0221 0,0011 -0,0118 0,0039 0,0221 
  (0,0080) (0,0083) (0,0336) (0,0082) (0,0078) (0,0082) 
0 -0,0331 -0,0624 -0,0313 -0,0378 -0,0372 -0,0192 
  (0,0103) (0,0106) (0,0430) (0,0103) (0,0100) (0,0102) 
1 -0,1048 -0,1745 -0,3397 0,0794 -0,1513 -0,2139 
  (0,0126) (0,0131) (0,0533) (0,0126) (0,0123) (0,0128) 
2 -0,0999 -0,1869 -0,3419 0,0998 -0,1483 -0,2205 
  (0,0148) (0,0153) (0,0620) (0,0146) (0,0144) (0,0146) 
3 -0,0938 -0,1919 -0,3468 0,1193 -0,1436 -0,2251 
  (0,0171) (0,0176) (0,0713) (0,0167) (0,0165) (0,0167) 
4 -0,0791 -0,1873 -0,3244 0,1352 -0,1301 -0,2145 
  (0,0193) (0,0199) (0,0807) (0,0188) (0,0186) (0,0188) 
5 -0,0689 -0,1902 -0,3256 0,1517 -0,1218 -0,2112 
  (0,0216) (0,0223) (0,0901) (0,0210) (0,0208) (0,0210) 
6 -0,0596 -0,1890 -0,3048 0,1571 -0,1132 -0,2028 
  (0,0239) (0,0246) (0,0995) (0,0231) (0,0230) (0,0231) 
7 -0,0515 -0,1909 -0,2867 0,1644 -0,1066 -0,1949 
  (0,0261) (0,0270) (0,1089) (0,0253) (0,0252) (0,0253) 
8 -0,0441 -0,1909 -0,2910 0,1722 -0,1005 -0,1929 
  (0,0284) (0,0293) (0,1183) (0,0275) (0,0273) (0,0275) 
9 -0,0346 -0,1868 -0,2650 0,1728 -0,0929 -0,1820 
  (0,0307) (0,0316) (0,1278) (0,0297) (0,0295) (0,0297) 
10 -0,0212 -0,1843 -0,2602 0,1877 -0,0855 -0,1747 
  (0,0330) (0,0340) (0,1373) (0,0318) (0,0317) (0,0319) 
11 -0,0019 -0,1670 -0,2580 0,2002 -0,0748 -0,1530 
  (0,0353) (0,0363) (0,1467) (0,0340) (0,0339) (0,0341) 
12 0,0164 -0,1562 -0,2317 0,2087 -0,0607 -0,1356 
  (0,0375) (0,0387) (0,1563) (0,0362) (0,0361) (0,0363) 
13 0,0265 -0,1523 -0,2274 0,2163 -0,0566 -0,1266 
  (0,0398) (0,0410) (0,1657) (0,0384) (0,0383) (0,0385) 
14 0,0360 -0,1504 -0,1953 0,2209 -0,0525 -0,1203 
  (0,0421) (0,0434) (0,1753) (0,0406) (0,0405) (0,0407) 
15 0,0449 -0,1495 -0,2034 0,2282 -0,0482 -0,1192 
  (0,0444) (0,0458) (0,1847) (0,0428) (0,0427) (0,0429) 
              
Constant 3,558 3,595 3,670 3,582 
  (0,0185) (0,0239) (0,0980) (0,0178) 
Observations 501103 284297 25059 501103 
R^2 0,61 0,62 0,63 0,64 
Notes: The entries in the tables are coefficient estimates of regressions of log daily real wages 
on displacement indicators interacted with dummies for years before and after job displacement. 
The omitted category are years four and five before job loss. All models also include individual 
fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a fourth order polynomial in potential labor market experi-
ence. The sample excludes apprentices. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are in 
parentheses.  
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Figure 5:  Wage Loss for Workers Losing Jobs in Car Manufacturing 
 
 
The remainder of the section analyzes job displacement effects by previ-
ous starting wages on wage loss and post-loss wage levels. We obtain four 
key results.  
1. There appears to be mean reversion. In particular, we find large differ-
ences in the degree of wage loss by previous starting wages, with the 
bottom gaining and the top losing.  
2. There are permanent winners and losers from job loss. Those workers 
with high past starting wages experience permanent losses, whereas 
those with low starting wages experience long term gains. 
3. Pre-job loss starting wage and job tenure have significant positive im-
pact on wage levels after job loss. As expected, there is positive selec-
tion into high tenure and high past starting wages. 
4. The effect of pre-job loss tenure and starting wage partly fades with 
time since job loss. These variables appear to serve as initial signal to 
the market of worker quality after a job loss. 
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Table 3 and Figure 6 show the estimates of percent wages lost at job loss 
for workers with high, medium, and low starting wages (based on the in-
ter-quartile range of log real starting wages at the previous job). Clearly, 
workers in the high and medium starting wage groups suffer large and 
persistent losses, and seem to drive the overall effect shown in Figure 5. 
Thereby, the medium group tends to recover after ten years, whereas 
workers in the high group suffer permanent earnings losses of more than 
ten percent. The group of workers with the smallest starting wages on the 
other hand has substantial benefits from the job loss that increase over 
time. 
Figure 6:  Wage Loss at Job Loss by Starting Wage at Previous Job 
 
 
These results suggest that starting wages contain firm-specific rents that 
fade upon job loss. The results also suggest that there is mean reversion 
in the labor market. This is consistent with a model of job search in which 
at job loss workers come from a different part of the wage distribution, 
but after job loss they are again ‘reset’ to the mean of the wage distribu-
tion irrespective of their previous position. Note that we would not expect 
to see the effect of previous wages fade fully, since they are likely to con-
tain some information on workers’ ability even beyond a fixed person ef-
fect. 
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5.3 The Determinants of Post-Job Loss Wage Levels 
To explore this aspect further, Table 4 analyzes the effect of pre-job loss 
characteristics on the level of log real wages after job loss. Thereby, the 
focus is particularly on the change in the effect of these characteristics 
over time, since this may further help discern the sources of persistence in 
the effect of initial conditions.  
Table 4:  Effect of Characteristics of Lost Job on Wage Levels After Job  
Displacement, Three Years Pre-Job Loss Tenure 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  - 0,066 - 0,119 Log Starting Wage at Lost Job 
(STWAGE)   - (0,0068) - (0,0091) 
  0,031 0,032 0,063 0,100 Years Since Displacement 
(YRSINCE)   (0,0012) (0,0012) (0,0025) (0,0056) 
YRSINCE^2   -0,0010 -0,0010 -0,0009 -0,0009 
    (0,0001) (0,0001) (0,0001) (0,0001) 
  0,0119 0,0121 0,0217 0,0223 Tenure on Past Job (TEN) 
  (0,0019) (0,0019) (0,0021) (0,0021) 
TEN^2   -0,00059 -0,00057 -0,00074 -0,00074 
    (0,0001) (0,0001) (0,0001) (0,0001) 
Years of Education (ED)   0,043 0,041 0,052 0,048 
    (0,0010) (0,0010) (0,0013) (0,0014) 
  0,084 0,080 0,082 0,074 Potential Labor Market Experi-
ence (EXP)   (0,0087) (0,0088) (0,0089) (0,0090) 
EXP^2   -0,00622 -0,00603 -0,00626 -0,00582 
    (0,00063) (0,00063) (0,00064) (0,00065) 
EXP^3   0,000184 0,000179 0,000189 0,000179 
    (0,000019) (0,000019) (0,000019) (0,000019) 
EXP^4   -0,000002 -0,000002 -0,000002 -0,000002 
    (0,00000) (0,00000) (0,00000) (0,00000) 
TEN*YRSINCE   - - -0,00127 -0,00129 
    - - (0,0001) (0,0001) 
ED*YRSINCE   - - -0,00186 -0,00148 
    - - (0,0002) (0,0002) 
STWAGE*YRSINCE   - - - -0,00959 
    - - - (0,0013) 
            
Observations   231185 231185 231185 231185 
R^2   0,36 0,36 0,36 0,36 
Notes: The entries in the table are coefficient estimates of regressions of log real daily wages 
after a job loss on characteristics of the lost job, year fixed effects, as well as individual charac-
teristics. The specifications mirror closely that of Kletzer (1989). Regressors not listed in the 
table are a dummy for female and non-german, as well as nine dummies for industry, five dum-
mies for occupation, a dummy for part time status, and three dummies for blue and white collar 
status, all pertaining to the lost job. The regression only include the first ten years after a job 
loss. Apprentices are excluded from the sample. Standard errors clustered at the individual level 
are in parentheses. 
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We first replicate Kletzer’s (1989) basic model that includes previous job 
tenure as basic additional control in a standard human capital model of log 
wages. We confirm Kletzer’s result that past job tenure has a positive ef-
fect on current wage levels; in fact, despite the different definition of job 
loss, our point estimates are quite similar to hers. As in her case, this sug-
gests that the positive correlation of tenure and wages not only arises 
from specific skills, but also from the fact that high tenured workers are 
likely to be more able workers. The next column in Table 4 also adds the 
log of previous starting wages to the Kletzer’s regression model. Again, we 
would expect past wages to have a positive effect on current wages as 
they are a function of components of workers’ skills not captured by ob-
servable characteristics. This is what we find – a 15% difference in start-
ing wages raises wages past layoff by about one percent.   
In addition to being correlated with actual worker skills, part of the initial 
effect of past job tenure or past wages may be only temporary. To ad-
dress this question, the last two columns of Table 4 show estimates from 
regression models that interact characteristics of the past job with time 
since job displacement. Column 3 shows the estimates for past job tenure. 
When the interaction with past job loss is included the initial effect dou-
bles, and there is a clear pattern of decay. Thus, the estimates in Column 
1 capture the average effect of past job tenure all the years prior to job 
loss, and obscure the fact that the effect fades over time. However, the 
effect does not fade completely even after ten years after job loss, sug-
gesting, perhaps not surprisingly, that there is still an important correla-
tion between past job tenure and unobserved worker skill.  
A similar pattern holds when past starting wages and their interaction with 
time since job loss are included in the model. The effect of past wages is 
initially larger and shows a linear pattern of decay (the estimates were not 
improved by including interactions with higher order polynomials of time 
since displacement). Again, the effect does not completely fade, suggest-
ing that conditional on observable characteristics past wages do contain 
information on workers’ productivity. However, after ten years over 80% 
of the initial effect is gone. 
These results appear to be consistent with the hypothesis that the initial 
effect of past tenure and past starting wages captures temporary in-
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creases in reservation wages. Over time, reservation wages are deter-
mined by current market conditions, and the effect of past rents fades. In 
addition, as workers continue searching for jobs, their wage is again de-
termined by their skills and overall wage distribution. 
Overall, we find that past starting wages contain firm specific components 
of earnings that are partly lost when workers are displaced. These compo-
nents may contain both group level effects, such as firm-entry cohort ef-
fects or average firm-wage premiums, as well as individual specific rents, 
for example from job search. In future work, we plan to use displaced 
workers from a larger sample to distinguish between these different com-
ponents. We also find that not all of the effect of past earnings is lost im-
mediately. Some of the past wage may affect reservation wages and 
search efforts and fades only slowly over time as workers continue to 
search for jobs. Concluding, the benefit of getting a high paying job is 
mostly relegated to that job, but has positive spill over effects to future 
jobs that persist for up to ten years past a job loss. 
6 Summary and Conclusion 
Persistence of entry-conditions within firms has intrigued economists for a 
long time, but few studies were able to provide comprehensive empirical 
evidence on the incidence and causes of such cohort effects. In this chap-
ter, we have used administrative information on wages and career pat-
terns for all workers who ever worked in the German car industry matched 
to information on their establishments to make two contributions to the 
literature. First, we describe the incidence and size of firm-entry cohort 
effects for a large sample of firms. This allows us to study both the het-
erogeneity of cohort-effects across our industry as well as their persis-
tence both within and between firms.  
Second, we have begun to analyze the sources of persistent wage-
differences between different entry cohorts within firms. In particular, we 
have analyzed whether initial wage advantages are lost when workers lose 
their job and spend some time in unemployment. If initial wage differ-
ences are driven by differences in general human capital, they should per-
sist when workers are forced to move to new jobs. If they are driven by 
firm-specific wage components, initial advantages should be lost at a job 
loss. To probe the degree of persistence of characteristics on the previous 
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job further, we also analyzed the effect of past job tenure and previous 
starting wages on the level of wages after the job loss. 
We find that firm-entry cohort effects are a common phenomenon among 
larger and stable firms in the German car manufacturing industry. Similar 
firms hiring similar workers at different points in time pay them different 
wages. We also find that these differences are quite heterogeneous among 
firms, such as they cannot be solely explained by market-wide business 
conditions. Initial wage differences between cohorts do tend to fade over 
time within firms. Similarly, firms’ wages tend to converge to a market 
wage. However, reversion of initial wage differences occurs slowly. 
In the second part, we find that initial wage differences are partly lost at 
job loss – high wage workers have much larger and highly persistent wage 
losses. This suggests that wage differences prior to a job loss are in part 
driven by temporary firm-specific rents. Part of these rents is likely to 
consist of firm-entry cohort differences, but they may also contain worker 
specific components such as search rents. We also observe mean rever-
sion, i.e., low wage workers seem to permanently benefit from job loss. 
Consistent with the presence of temporary firm-specific wage compo-
nents, past starting wages have an initial positive effect on wage levels 
after a job loss that fades over time. Pre-job loss characteristics appear to 
affect displaced workers’ reservation wages until their wage is again de-
termined by their skills and the overall wage distribution. 
The results in this chapter highlight several important questions and areas 
for future research. First, it will be important to confirm our results with a 
wider sample of firms covering the entire German economy. An additional 
important question for future research is to establish to what extent 
worker mobility contributes to the reversion of initial differences in wages 
between entry-cohorts. Third, using a larger sample we will be able to 
study the effect of exogenous events such as a mass-layoff at the estab-
lishment level. Similarly, we will be able to distinguish the loss of group-
specific rents, such as average firm wage effects or cohort effects, from 
the loss of individual specific wage components arising among others from 
job search. 
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